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ABSTRACT
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder.  The
founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as
well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange.  We assume that a
professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder’s decision is shaped
by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the
Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases,
and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
1Most firms in the world are controlled by their founders, or by the founders’ families and
heirs.  Such family ownership is nearly universal among privately held firms, but also dominant
among publicly traded firms.  In Western Europe, South and East Asia, Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa, the vast majority of publicly traded firms are family controlled (La Porta et
al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, European Corporate Governance Network 2001, Faccio and Lang
2002).  But even in the United States and the U.K., some of the largest publicly traded firms,
such as Wal-Mart Stores and Ford Motor, are controlled by families.
A crucial issue in the discussion of family firms from the perspective of corporate
governance and finance is succession.  For nearly every entrepreneurial firm that does not fail,
there comes a moment when the founder no longer wishes to manage it.  This can happen from
the very beginning, when founders seek professional managers to run their firms, as is the case in
high technology startups in the United States.  Alternatively, a founder can retire or cut his work
load later in life, and appoint either a heir or a professional as a successor.  When control is
turned over to a professional, ownership and management become separated.
The patterns of separation of ownership and management vary across countries.  In the
United States, founders often hire professional managers early on.  By the time a founder retires,
his family retains only marginal ownership.   In such Berle and Means (1932) corporations,
professional managers exercise nearly full control.  In Western Europe, significant ownership
typically stays with the family after the founder retires.  His children either hire a manager, as in
BMW or FIAT, or run the firm themselves, as in Peugeot. In emerging markets, both
management and ownership tend to stay with the family when the founder retires.  Occasionally
in both developed and emerging markets, a manager marries into the family, as happened at
Bombardier in Canada, Matshushita in Japan, and Worldwide Shipping in Hong Kong.
2There are three broad theories of the benefits to a family of preserving control.1
According to the first, there is a significant “amenity potential” of family control.  The term
“amenity potential,” suggested by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), refers to non-pecuniary private
benefits of control, meaning utility to the founder that does not come at the expense of profits.  A
founder may derive pleasure from having his child run the company that bears the family name.
Alternatively, in some industries, such as sports or the media, a family can participate in, or even
influence, exciting social, political, and cultural events through ownership of firms.  This reason
for family control suggests that there will be a distribution of ownership patterns within a
country, with companies delivering a large amenity potential of control staying in family hands.
If the amenity potential is large, we expect families to try to maintain control as long as
they can.  Only if a firm desperately needs capital and cannot raise it without a control change, or
if the founder dies and significant inheritance taxes are due, will control be sold off.  Some
recent research indeed points to the importance of these considerations.  In a cross-section of 20
countries, Wells (1998) finds a higher incidence of widely-held, as opposed to family-controlled,
firms in countries with higher inheritance taxes.  Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001, 2002)
present theoretical models linking the persistence of family control to imperfect capital markets.
In our model, we recognize the role of the amenity potential in keeping some firms under family
control.  But we use a framework that simultaneously explains capital market underdevelopment
and the prevalence of family ownership based on institutional characteristics of a country.
A second reason for the preservation of family control is that the name itself may be a
carrier of a reputation, in both economic and political markets.  Families may stand for quality
(as advertisements often argue), or for political connections.  Italy’s Agnellis have stayed close
to the government, sometimes having family members in the cabinet, and always securing public
3transfers to Fiat.  Such “reputational benefits” would be diluted if control is surrendered to an
outsider.  This theory suggests, counter-factually, that ceteris paribus family-controlled firms
would be more valuable than firms controlled by professionals.  Although it deserves a closer
analysis, we do not consider the connection between family control and politics in this paper.
We focus on a third theory of family ownership, namely the possibility of expropriation
of outside investors that comes with control.  Unlike the amenity potential, such private benefits
of control, described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1988), do come at
the expense of profits accruing to the outside investors.   In our theory, the principal benefit of
hiring a professional is that he is likely to be a better manager. The principal cost is that now the
professional manager, rather than the founder, controls the company and so can expropriate
investors. We argue that a crucial factor shaping the attractiveness of delegated management is
the degree of legal protection of outside shareholders from expropriation (or tunneling) by the
insiders. Earlier research shows that such protection varies sharply across countries, and that this
variation predicts the differences in financial development and ownership structures (La Porta et
al. 1997, 1998, 2000a,b, Johnson et al. 2000). In this paper, we examine the costs and benefits of
delegating management from this perspective. This allows us, in particular, to examine the costs
and benefits of keeping the succession of management inside the family.
We present a model of a founder looking for a manager to succeed him.  We assume that
there is no superior manager available with sufficient resources to buy the firm outright.  When
such a manager (or a company) is available, the firm is simply sold to them – as often happens.
Absent an outright buyer, the founder chooses among three options.  He can sell out completely
in the stock market and create a widely held firm run by a professional manager.  He can hire a
professional manager but stay on as a large shareholder to monitor him.  He can also keep the
4firm inside the family by either staying on as a less than ideal manager or passing management to
a family member, who is generally not as talented as a professional. The founder maximizes his
welfare, which is equal to the sum of the value of the retained block, the revenues from selling
shares to investors, and the amenity potential obtained only if the family keeps control.
We study the trade-off between superior management by the professional outsider and his
discretion to expropriate shareholders. If the founder stays on as a large shareholder and
monitors, he can control expropriation to some extent. In our framework, both the law and the
monitoring reduce managerial expropriation. We show that when the family’s amenity potential
from managing the firm is very large, ownership and management are never separated.  In
contrast, management and ownership are always separated when the discrepancy in the
managerial abilities of the professional and the founder (or heir) is very large and the amenity
potential is small.  Except for these extremes, the decision to keep control in the family depends
on the quality of legal protection.
When legal protection of outside investors is very good, there is no need for monitoring
in equilibrium, and the best arrangement is a widely held professionally-managed firm.  When
legal protection of outside investors is moderate, the benefits of professional managers are still
high enough for the entrepreneur to surrender control, but it pays for him or his family to remain
as large shareholders and monitor the manager. Finally, with sufficiently weak shareholder
protection, the founder’s ability to control expropriation is too limited, and management stays
with his family even when someone else can run the firm better.  In general, this analysis leads to
a prediction of a negative relationship between investor protection and ownership concentration,
consistent with a range of empirical evidence.
We consider two versions of the model, one in which the founder – when he detects
5expropriation – forces the manager to stop it and pay dividends, and another in which he and the
manager just share the spoils.  In the first version, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the founder
provides a public good to the minority shareholders by monitoring the manager. In the second
version, monitoring is no longer a public good, the benefits of which are shared by all
shareholders.  In fact, the only effect of monitoring is to raise the founder’s share of the loot. The
basic results we describe hold in both specifications, but the second version also yields the
empirically accurate prediction of a positive premium paid for a controlling block of shares.
At a theoretical level, the model combines in one unified framework the twin conflicts
essential to understanding corporate governance: that between the manager and the outside
shareholders, and that between the large shareholder and the minority shareholders.  By doing so,
the model sheds light on the different prevalent patterns of ownership and management among
countries.   It shows, for example, why Anglo-Saxon patterns of corporate governance, with
widely-held firms and traditional conflicts between professional managers and dispersed
shareholders (Berle and Means 1932), are likely to be a feature of countries with very good legal
protection of minority shareholders.   It explains why “family” firms, in which the founder’s
family is a significant shareholder, or even the manager, over several generations are such an
enduring phenomenon in countries with less effective legal protection of shareholders (La Porta
et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000).   Indeed, it explains how, in such countries, the twin conflicts
between the manager and the large shareholder and between the two of them combined and the
minority shareholders, coexist.  The model is moreover consistent with the evidence that family
management is generally inferior to professional management (Morck et al. 2000, Perez-
Gonzales 2001).2 The basic trade-off between the benefits of delegated management, and the
costs of giving up control – especially when legal protection is poor – appears consistent with a
6great deal of data.
 Our paper joins a growing theoretical literature on corporate governance in the regimes of
poor investor protection.  Bebchuk (1999) shows that poor legal protection renders dispersed
ownership structure unstable, because it allows extraction of significant private benefits.  La
Porta et al. (2002) and Himmelberg et al. (2001) study theoretically and empirically the
determination of ownership structure when firms raise funds to finance investment.  Burkart and
Panunzi (2001) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) analyze the impact of legal shareholder
protection on the optimal ownership structure.  Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) consider owner-
managers and examine the relationship between legal protection and inside equity. Burkart and
Panunzi (2001) assume that the professional manager and the large shareholder are distinct
parties and analyze the relationship between the law and outside ownership concentration. By
making the separation of ownership and management a choice variable, the present model
extends and generalizes these two papers.
 The paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines the model. Section II examines the
founder’s decision to hire a professional manager and to float shares when he cannot share
private benefits. Section III analyses the case with collusion between founder and professional
manager and derives implications for share value, block premium, and agency costs of separating
ownership and management.  Section IV concludes.  Mathematical proofs are in the appendix.
I. The model
Figure 1 presents the model’s timeline. We consider a firm initially fully owned by its
founder. At date 0, the founder decides whether to appoint a professional manager to run the firm
or keep management in the family. Simultaneously, he decides what fraction 1-α  of the shares to
7sell to dispersed shareholders. The family keeps the remaining fraction α .  All shareholders are
risk-neutral. If management stays in the family, there is no separation of ownership and
management. If the founder appoints a professional manager, ownership and management are
separated. In this case, the founder may also offer a wage and the professional manager accepts
or rejects the offer to run the company at date 1.
Figure 1
______________________________________________________________________________________
0 1 2 3
Founder chooses the Manager’s job Founder chooses Decision on
manager, sells acceptance monitoring intensity m dividends and
1-α shares, offers decision private benefits.
professional manager Payoffs are
wage wvM realized
At date 3, the firm generates revenues that depend on the identity of the manager. If
control remains inside the family, total revenues generated are Fv . In addition, the amenity
potential B  accrues to the founder. B may differ across founders and industries, but it does not
reduce revenues Fv . If a professional manager runs the firm, total revenues are Mv . The
professional manager may also enjoy some amenity potential from running the firm.  He also has
an outside option. To economize on notation, let c  denote the professional manager’s utility
when pursuing his outside option net of the foregone amenity potential.  For simplicity, the
outside option of the founder or the family is normalized to zero.
Assumption 1: FM vcv >− .
8There are two interpretations of the model. Under the first, the choice is between the
founder himself, who is becoming outdated or reluctant to manage, and a professional outsider.
Under the second, the founder definitely retires from management, and chooses as his successor
either a professional manager or his heir. In both interpretations, retaining management inside
the family reduces the profitability of the firm relative to hiring a professional.
Assumption 1 is consistent with a recent study by Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000)
of corporate control of Canadian firms. They find that heir-controlled firms have lower returns
on sales and assets than comparable firms. Furthermore, firms with founder control have
earnings that are lower than those of widely held firms but higher than those in heir-controlled
firms. Perez-Gonzales (2001) provides evidence on firm performance following inherited control
by studying 162 family transitions in the United States.  In 38% of these cases, family members
inherit the CEO position.  These family CEOs are promoted to the post an average of 9 years
earlier than professional managers and are detrimental to firm performance- the return on assets
falls by 16% within two years of transition and 25% compared with unrelated CEOs.
In this model, if the founder is the best manager himself, there is no reason for him ever
to sell equity.  He stays on as the manager, keeps 100% of the firm, and there are no agency
problems or conflicts.  This assumption distinguishes the model from the papers of La Porta et al.
(2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), and Himmelberg et al. (2001), where equity is raised to
finance investment projects, and therefore the size of the firm is endogenous.
The problems arise when the founder is no longer the best manager.  He must then
choose between hiring a more qualified outsider to manage, or alternatively staying on or
(equivalently) naming a mediocre son as a successor.  Importantly, we assume that the competent
professional outsider has neither the resources nor the external funds to just buy the firm himself.
9As we show below, the outsiders’ inability to raise external funds is consistent with the
assumptions of the model, since to buy the firm, he has to pay for the private benefits accruing to
the founder, which he cannot pledge to investors. Unless the superior manager is himself rich, he
has to work for the family.  Hiring a professional separates ownership from management.
At date 2, shareholders can monitor the professional manager and thereby deprive him of
at least some private benefits. The monitoring technology is discussed below.
At date 3, the revenues can either be paid out to all shareholders proportionally to their
ownership stakes or diverted to generate private benefits Φ . In countries with weakest
shareholder protection, such private benefits take the form of outright theft. More commonly,
they take the form of transactions with related parties, expropriation of corporate opportunities,
transfer pricing, excessive salaries and perquisites, and so on (see Johnson et al. 2000).
Whoever manages the firm chooses the level of expropriation, subject to being monitored
and partially impeded by the law. The non-contractible expropriation decision is modeled as the
choice of ]1,0[∈φ , such that security benefits (dividends) are iv)1( φ− , and private benefits are
ivφΦ = , ., FMi =  Expropriation of shareholders is limited by the law. To model legal
shareholder protection, we assume that the law sets an upper bound ]1,0[∈φ  on the fraction of
revenues that can be (at no cost) diverted by the party in control.3 Stronger legal protection
corresponds to lower values of φ .
The law is not the only determinant of the fraction of resources diverted for private
benefits. The other is monitoring, which occurs when a professional manager is hired.
Althoughin principle all shareholders can monitor the manager, the free-rider problem prevents
small shareholders from choosing to incur the cost.  In equilibrium only the large shareholder
monitors to reduce the fraction of resources appropriated by the manager.4  Recall that the legal
10
upper bound on private benefits of control is Mvφ . Following Pagano and Röell (1998), we
assume that the large shareholder can at a cost 
2
2
mk  reduce private benefit extraction by Mmv
where [0,1]m∈  and 0k > .
The private benefits Φ  differ from the amenity potential B  in two respects: they come at
the expense of security benefits and their size depends on the legal shareholder protection and (in
the absence of collusion) on the monitoring intensity.
Private monitoring and the law are alternative mechanisms for reducing expropriation of
shareholders.  In our model, when k is strictly positive, monitoring is costly to the founder
whereas reliance on the law is free.  Some legal protection, such as disclosure mandated by law,
is indeed enforced by the authorities and is truly free to the founder though not to the society.
Other kinds of legal protection require an investment in resources, such as litigation, by the
founder.  What we require is not that the law be literally free to the founder, but that reducing
managerial extraction by a given amount through a combination of stricter rules and less
monitoring be cheaper for the founder and the shareholders than achieving the same protection
through a combination of weaker laws (higher φ ) and more monitoring (higher m).
Alternatively, one can think of legal protection as reducing the cost of monitoring.  Our
framework can accommodate this interpretation.  The cost parameter k would then be a measure
of shareholder protection: the law protects shareholders by increasing the effectiveness of
monitoring. 5  Under this formulation, private monitoring and the law are complements rather
than substitutes.  The crucial feature of our model is that better legal protection mitigates the
agency problem between the management and the shareholders either by directly reducing the
scope of expropriation or by making the founder’s intervention more effective.
11
Importantly, we assume that corporate and other law governing investor protection
matters, and that firms cannot opt into more protective legal regimes via a contract, such as
cross-listing or a better corporate charter. This assumption is consistent with the evidence that
legal rules governing investor protection in different countries have significant consequences for
financial development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000b).  This assumption is also consistent
with recent theory and evidence pointing to the limited usefulness of such contractual solutions
(Nenova 2002, Siegel 2002).  If a founder could opt into a more protective legal regime before
selling any shares, he would do so since in equilibrium he bears the monitoring cost of reducing
managerial expropriation.
If a professional manager is hired, the question arises whether a monitoring founder can
enjoy (part of) the private benefits. We consider both the cases of collusion and no collusion
between the professional manager and the founder. Excluding the founder from the spoils of
extraction is tantamount to assuming that his interests and those of the small shareholders are
perfectly congruent. This case is most appropriate when the legal duties of the large shareholder,
perhaps as a board member, bar him from complicity with the manager in expropriating
shareholders. In contrast, when the founder and the professional manager can share the private
benefits, they may collude at the expense of minority shareholders. This assumption might be
more suitable for weaker legal regimes. The second assumption complicates the model, in that
rent-seeking monitoring, intended to capture some of the private benefits rather than serve all
shareholders, becomes attractive. We solve the model under the first assumption in the next
section, and under the second in section III.
II. Owner-Manager or Professional Manager
12
We analyze the founder’s decision whether to hire a professional manager in steps. We
begin by considering the founder’s maximization problem for the cases of non-separation and
separation of ownership and management. In each case, we solve the model by backward
induction, going from the date 3 expropriation decision, to the founder’s date 2 monitoring
intensity, to the manager’s date 1 job acceptance choice. We then can determine the optimal
number of shares that the founder retains in cases of separation and non-separation. Having done
that, we can compare the entrepreneur’s welfare for different legal environments, i.e., different
values of φ , which enables us to infer under what circumstances he chooses to separate
ownership from management.
A) No Separation of Ownership and Management
Due to the simplicity of the model, the case of no separation does not yield precise
predictions, notably for the ownership structure. At date 3 the founder decides how to allocate
the revenues. While the law does not influence the amenity potential B , it constrains the founder
to divert no more than vφ  of the revenues as private benefits Φ . Unless he owns all the shares,
in which case he is indifferent between any [0, ]φ φ∈ , he extracts the legal upper bound φ .
Absent a professional manager, there is neither date 2 monitoring nor a date 1 job acceptance
decision. Hence, we move directly to the founder’s date 0 decision as to which fraction of shares
to sell to outside investors. The founder maximizes his welfare
BvvvV FFF
NS +−−++−= )1)(1()1( φαφφα .  The first term, (1 ) F Fv vα φ φ− + , is the value of
his date 3 block; the second term, Fv)1)(1( φα −− , is the proceeds from selling 1 α−  shares at
date 0; the final term is the amenity potential.  Since diversion is efficient and since the founder
is by assumption neither financially constrained nor risk averse, the optimal ownership structure
13
is indeterminate when ownership and management are separated.
Lemma 1: For any [0,1]φ ∈ , BvV FNS +=)( *α  and [ ]* 0,1α ∈ .
The founder’s welfare is equal to Fv B+ , total revenues under his management plus the
amenity potential of managing the company. Even though private benefit extraction decreases
with the quality of the law, the founder’s welfare is independent of the legal environment. Since
the extraction of private benefits is efficient, each diverted dollar reduces the security benefits by
a dollar. Diversion reduces the price at which the founder can sell shares to investors, but
increases the value of his block by an identical amount. The sum of security and private benefits
(including both the amenity potential B and private benefits Φ ) is constant.
B) Separation of ownership and management
What happens when ownership and management are separated? The founder gives up the
amenity potential B  and also transfers to the professional manager the opportunity to divert
corporate revenues as private benefits rather than pay them out as dividends to the shareholders.
While the law constrains diversion, the founder can further limit private benefit extraction
through monitoring.  Monitoring may also induce opportunistic behavior by the founder even
when he does not share in the private benefits. Once the professional manager has accepted to
run the firm and revenues are realized, the founder has an incentive to reduce the professional
manager’s private benefits by monitoring more. Anticipating high levels of monitoring, the
professional manager may reject the offer to run the firm. That is, the founder may over-monitor
in the sense of the ex post optimal monitoring level exceeding the ex ante optimal amount
(Pagano and Roell 1998). To induce the manager to accept running the firm, the founder has to
14
commit himself not to monitor excessively. He can do so by dispersing (some of) the shares to
small investors because the actual monitoring intensity is determined by the size of the founder’s
equity stake (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997). In addition (or instead), the founder may offer
the professional manager monetary incentives to convince him to run the firm.
We solve the game by backward induction, beginning with the date 3 resource allocation
decision. Total revenues under the professional manager are Mv . The law stipulates that
Mv)1( φ−  must be paid out either to shareholders as dividends or to the professional manager as
salary. What fraction of the remaining Mvφ  is actually diverted depends on monitoring. The
founder monitoring with intensity m can control the use of an additional fraction m  (or at most
φ ) of Mv . Being excluded from sharing private benefits, the founder forces the professional
manager to disgorge all of them as dividends. The professional manager then has discretion over
{ }Mvm)(,0max −φ  in resources. He strictly prefers to extract them as private benefits, unless he
is the sole shareholder.
Since private benefit extraction is efficient, there are no gains to shareholders from using
monetary incentives to resolve the conflict over resource allocation. To induce the manager to
abstain from extracting an additional dollar, shareholders have to offer him this dollar as a
transfer. Monetary incentives, henceforth called the wage, can, however, play a role in inducing
the manager to accept the job of running the firm. Let Mwv  denote the wage paid to the
professional manager when he accepts the job offer from the founder.6
At date 2, the founder chooses the monitoring intensity. For a given block α  and for a
given wage rate w, the founder maximizes 
2
)1(
2mkvmw M −+−− φα .7 He receives a fraction α
of the security benefits net of the wage bill less his monitoring costs. Since the law already
15
shields Mv)1( φ−  of the revenues from private benefit extraction, the founder never monitors
more than φ . Hence, 


=
k
vm Mαφ ,min and weakly increases with the block size.
At date 1, the manager accepts to run the firm if the sum of the wage and the private
benefits exceeds his outside utility c .8  The condition cvmw M ≥−+ )( φ  can be rewritten as
.
Mv
cwmm −+=≤ φ
 High levels of monitoring and strict legal rules reduce the professional manager’s private
benefits and may thus discourage him from running the firm.  Offering him a higher wage can
sway him to accept the job.  Higher ownership concentration and better legal protection make it
more difficult to satisfy the professional manager’s participation constraint, whereas higher
wages make it easier.  This is the basic trade-off when ownership and management are separated.
At date 0, the founder chooses the ownership structure and the wage to maximize his
welfare [ ]
2
1
2mkvmwV M
s −+−−= φ  subject to the manager’s participation constraint.
If the founder were to choose an ownership structure such that Mv
k
φ α< , the professional
manager would be left with zero private benefits. Consequently, the founder would have to offer
a wage w c=  to induce the professional manager to accept the job. Leaving some private
benefits to the professional manager in exchange for a lower wage saves on monitoring costs.
Hence, the founder always chooses an ownership structure such that Mv
k
φ α>  and Mvm
k
α= .
Inserting the monitoring level Mvm
k
α=  into the founder’s welfare yields
16
k
vv
k
vwV MMM
S
2
)()1(
2ααφ −+−−= with 2/ (1 ) / 0S MdV d v kα α= − ≥  and / 0S MdV dw v= − < .
The founder’s welfare increases with ownership concentration and decreases with the wage,
provided that the professional manager’s participation constraint is satisfied.
A binding participation constraint is obviously in the interest of the founder as any
managerial rent comes at his expense. Sometimes, however, the founder cannot avoid leaving
some rents to the professional manager. More precisely, there are parameter values for which the
participation constraint cvmw M ≥−+ )( φ  does not bind despite a fully concentrated ownership
structure and a zero wage.  This occurs when / /M Mv k c vφ > + .  We want to allow for the
possibility of legal regimes in which the professional manager can extract a rent.
Assumption 2: 1<+
M
M
v
c
k
v
Since 1≤φ , Assumption 2 is a necessary condition for  / /M Mv k c vφ > +  to hold.
Lemma 2
i) For ,
Mv
c≤φ  ,0* =α  φ−= Mvcw /* , 0* =m , and
cvwV M
S −=),,( ** φα .
ii) For ,
k
v
v
c
v
c M
MM
+≤< φ 


 −=
MM v
c
v
k φα * , 0* =w , *
M
cm
v
φ= − ,
2
**
2
),,( 


 −−−=
M
M
S
v
ckcvwV φφα .
iii) For 
k
v
v
c M
M
+>φ , 1* =α , 0* =w , 
k
vm M=* , and
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2
* *( , , ) (1 )
2
S M
M
vV w v
k
α φ φ= − + .
When legal protection is strong (case i), then, even in the absence of monitoring, private
benefits are insufficient to induce the professional manager to run the firm. Consequently,
ownership is completely dispersed and the professional manager is offered a wage equal to the
difference between his outside utility and the private benefits. The founder’s resulting welfare
* *( , , )SV wα φ is at its highest possible level under separation ( cvM − ) and does not depend on
the quality of legal rules.
When legal protection is moderate (case ii), expected private benefits exceed the outside
utility c. As a result, the founder has to monitor the professional manager to limit the size of his
rent. Setting the wage equal to zero minimizes the monitoring intensity that keeps the
professional manager’s participation constraint binding. Since monitoring is costly, this
dominates all other combinations of positive wage and monitoring level that also leave no rent to
the professional manager. A positive wage and concentrated ownership do not co-exist in
equilibrium. Due to the monitoring costs, the founder’s welfare * *( , , )SV wα φ  is below its
highest possible level. Moreover, * *( , , )SV wα φ  decreases in both φ  and k : less legal protection
entails a higher optimal level of monitoring, and a higher k makes monitoring more expensive.
When legal protection is poor (case iii) the founder cannot avoid leaving a rent to the
professional manager. Offering a zero wage and retaining all shares to implement a monitoring
level /Mm v k=  is all that the founder can do. The resulting rent to the professional manager is
equal to cv
k
vR MM −−= )(φ . The founder’s welfare * *( , , )SV wα φ  is equal to the highest
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possible level ( cvM − ) less monitoring costs and managerial rent. As in the range with moderate
legal protection, * *( , , )SV wα φ  decreases in both φ  and k .9
We now turn to the final step of determining the conditions under which the founder
chooses to hire a professional manager. The answer follows from comparing the founder’s
welfare under no separation NSV  (Lemma 1) to that under separation SV  (Lemma 2). The next
Propositions describe the overall equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1
i) If F Mv B v c+ ≥ − , ownership and management are never separated.
ii) If 2 / 2M Fv k v B≥ + , ownership and management are always separated.
When the family’s amenity potential B  exceeds the professional manager’s superior
ability net of his outside option ( FM vcvB −−≥ ), separation of ownership and management is
never optimal, irrespective of the quality of legal protection.  A necessary condition for
separation is that FM vcvB −−< . At the other extreme, if the discrepancy between the
managerial abilities of the professional and the founder (or his heir) is very large, keeping
management in the family is always inferior. The founder or the family retains an ownership
stake of a size depending on the quality of the legal protection as described in Lemma 2, but give
up control. The condition 2 / 2M Fv k v B≥ +  is intuitive if we examine the founder’s welfare under
separation at its minimum when the law provides no protection ( 1φ = ).  In this case, all dividend
payments are exclusively due to monitoring, a fully concentrated ownership structure is optimal,
and 2 / 2S MV v k= , which is still better than keeping control in the family.
Proposition 1 sheds light on some of the reasons for observing a variation in ownership
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structures within a country, so the legal protection of investors is held roughly constant.  Even
with very strong protection of investors, a founder might want to keep control in the family if the
amenity potential is very large or if the heir is relatively competent.  Consistent with this
prediction, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) document the pervasiveness of family control in the media
and professional sports companies in the United States. Conversely, even with very weak
investor protection, family control is likely to be surrendered when the heir is at a particularly
strong disadvantage in management.  Thus, in Western Europe, one often sees professionally
managed firms in relatively “technical” areas, such as utilities and telecommunications.
Consider now the parameter range of “moderate” amenity potential and relative
competency of the heir: 2 / 2M F Mv k v B v c< + < − .  In this range, the law shapes the attractiveness
of hiring a professional manager. Denote by 
*
( / ,1)Mc vφ ∈  the unique value of φ  such that
* *( , , )S NSV w Vα φ = .  This value exists because 2 / 2M Fv k v B< + .
Proposition 2
If 2 / 2M F Mv k v B v c< + < −  there are three regimes:
i) When legal shareholder protection is strong ( / Mc vφ ≤ ), ownership and
management are separated, and ownership is fully dispersed.
ii) When legal protection is moderate (
*
( / , ]Mc vφ φ∈ ), ownership and management
are separated, and the founder retains a block.
iii) When legal protection is poor (
*φ φ> ), there is no separation of ownership and
management.
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When legal rules are very protective i.e., with 
Mv
c≤φ , the separation of ownership and
management allows the founder to capitalize on the superior ability of the professional manager
and only give up the amenity potential B . Strong legal protection also solves at no cost to the
founder the agency conflict over the allocation of revenues. More precisely, the law restricts
private benefit extraction below the professional manager’s outside utility. Letting this manager
divert corporate resources is part of his compensation package, which needs to be supplemented
by a wage. In this case, selling all the equity and hiring a professional manager is the optimal
choice for the founder.
In this model, a legal system with strong protection of outside shareholders is socially
desirable. The best manager is hired to run the firm, and no resources are wasted on monitoring.
This conclusion is driven by the assumption that law enforcement is free – at least from the
viewpoint of the founder.  If better legal protection imposes higher enforcement costs on the
society, we would have to compare these costs with the social costs of private monitoring.10
Once investor protection falls below the threshold Mvc / , the separation of ownership and
management involves a trade-off.  On the one hand, the firm is run by a more qualified manager.
On the other hand, the founder has to incur monitoring costs (and possibly leave a rent to the
professional manager) as well as give up the amenity potential .B
When ownership and management are separated, the founder’s welfare SV decreases with
φ , because weaker legal protection entails higher monitoring costs and (possibly) an increasing
managerial rent. In contrast, when ownership and management are not separated, the founder’s
welfare is BvF +  and independent of the quality of legal protection. Hence, there exists a unique
threshold value 
*φ  below which the cost of separating ownership and management (monitoring
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costs, managerial rent, and B ) is less than the gain in managerial efficiency ( )M Fv c v− − . In this
case the founder or family simply retains an ownership stake whose size depends on legal
protection (Lemma 2). Conversely, for 
*φ φ>  the forgone efficiency loss associated with
keeping control in the family is smaller than the agency costs of separating ownership and
management. This holds when the sum of B and revenues under family control exceeds the net
dividends under separation.
Propositions 1 and 2 can be described in a simple diagram, which shows the gains and
costs of appointing a professional manager as a function of the degree of legal protection φ
(Figure 2). The gain is independent of φ  and is reflected by horizontal line FM vcv −− . The
cost includes the monitoring cost, managerial rent, and the foregone amenity potential B.  As
Proposition 1 and Figure 2 show, B could be very high, in which case there is no separation
regardless of the legal regime, or very low, in which case there is separation for any legal regime.
In the intermediate range, it follows from Lemma 2 that below / Mc vφ ≤  the cost is constant and
equal to B , in the range / / /M M Mc v c v v kφ< ≤ +  the cost increases at an increasing rate, and
above / /M Mc v v kφ > +  the cost increases linearly in φ . The parameter restrictions
2 / 2M F Mv k v B v c< + < −  ensures that the two lines cross at */ 1Mc v φ< < , i.e. we are in the
parameter range where Proposition 2 applies.
The model has a clear implication for how the law shapes ownership structure:
Proposition 3
When ownership and management are separated and * (0,1)α ∈ , more concentrated
ownership structures go together with weaker legal protection, i.e., / 0d dα φ ≥ .
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The founder’s objective when ownership and management are separated is to pay the
professional manager no more than his outside utility. Both legal protection and monitoring
restrict the manager’s extraction of private benefits. Since the law does this at no cost, the
founder resorts to monitoring only to the extent that the law leaves the manager a payoff in
excess of his outside utility. To keep manager’s participation constraint binding, the founder has
to monitor more as legal protection deteriorates. Thus, for ( / , / / ]M M Mc v c v v kφ ∈ + , legal
protection and ownership concentration are inversely related when ownership and management
are separated.11
Propositions 2 and 3 make strong empirical predictions, namely that family ownership
should be common around the world, and relatively more common in countries with poor
investor protection.  Recent empirical work is consistent with these predictions. Family control is
the dominant form of corporate ownership around the world.  Looking at the 20 largest firms in
27 wealthy economies, La Porta et al. (1999) find that families or individuals control 30% in
number and 25% in value of the top 20 firms in each country.  These numbers are higher for
smaller firms.  Family transitions are a frequent and important occurrence: only about one third
of family controlled firms are run by their founders, the rest by descendants or by families that
came to own them later.  In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) show that widely held firms are more
common in countries with good shareholder protection: 34% versus 16% in the countries with a
low level of protection. Moreover, ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable.  In short, when
expropriation is a concern, firms remain family controlled.
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that with the exception of Japan, more than
50% of all publicly traded firms in nine East Asian countries are controlled by families and that
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the top 15 families control significant shares of country wealth.12  East Asian countries outside
Japan are indeed known for particularly poor protection of outside investors.  Faccio and Lang
(2002) find higher incidence of family firms in countries with inferior shareholder protection in a
large sample of West European corporations.  The European Corporate Governance Network
(2001) documents the prevalence of concentrated corporate ownership in OECD countries.
Propositions 1 and 2 together predict both the general tendencies in ownership patterns
across countries, and the existence of – possibly large – variation within each country.  In our
model, the sources of within-country variation are the amenity potential of control and the
differences in skill between heirs and professionals.  Of course, there are other potential sources
of within-country variation.  If firms require outside finance for expansion, or to pay inheritance
taxes, ownership is likely to become dispersed.  Such dispersion is compatible with the
preservation of family control if shares with inferior voting rights are sold in the market.  This
external finance effect is likely to reinforce our finding: since valuations in countries with
weaker investor protection are lower, using markets to raise funds is less attractive, raising the
attractiveness of family control (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  Another force toward ownership
dispersion – diversification – is also less powerful in markets with lower valuations.
Propositions 1 and 2 analyze the institutional conditions under which professional
managers are hired. Alternatively, one can consider the managerial efficiency gain necessary to
have separation of ownership and management in a regime with weak legal protection.
Corollary 1
The separation of ownership and management requires higher managerial skills in
regimes with poorer legal shareholder protection.
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The founder’s welfare under separation SV  increases with both the professional
manager’s ability (higher cvM −  values) and the quality of the law (lower φ  values).  In
contrast, the founder’s welfare under no separation NSV is independent of φ .  Ceteris paribus, the
switch from keeping family control to hiring a professional manager requires a more able
professional manager when legal protection is less effective: Such legal regimes are associated
with higher agency costs of separation of ownership and management. To make hiring a
professional manager nonetheless worthwhile, the efficiency gain must be larger.  
This section has analyzed how legal rules affect the trade-off between the benefits and
costs of separating ownership and management. The model makes accurate predictions about the
patterns of such separation in different countries. Some implications of our basic model do,
however, clash with the empirical evidence. In particular, the model implies that the founder’s
block trades at a discount when ownership and management are separated. There is some
evidence of negative block premia, but they are the exception rather than the rule.  In a study of
63 large block sales in the U.S. that are not necessarily made by founders, Barclay and
Holderness (1989) report that about 20 percent were priced at a discount to the post-
announcement exchange price.  On average, however, block premia are both positive and higher
in countries with weaker protection of outside shareholders (Zingales 1994, Nenova 2002, Dyck
and Zingales 2002).  The reason for the negative block premia in our model is that all
shareholders benefit in proportion of their stakes from monitoring, but only the founder bears the
cost.  The negative block premium follows from the assumption that the founder cannot extract
any private benefits, thereby ensuring that monitoring is a public good.  In the next section, we
allow the founder to benefit privately from his monitoring activity.
A final theoretical point concerns our assumption that ownership structure remains stable
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once the manager has accepted to run the company. If the founder had the opportunity and
incentive to retrade ex-post, he may want to increase his stake and extract a higher fraction of
private benefits from the manager. This, in turn, would affect the decision of the manager to
accept the offer to run the company.  For the model in this section, we can prove that, so long as
trade in not anonymous, the purchase of an additional fraction of shares is not profitable for the
founder.  Because shareholders free ride on the entire value improvement implied by the
founder’s final holding,13 the founder does not make a profit on the additional shares acquired in
the retrading stage. Moreover, the increase in the monitoring costs due to the larger final holding
exceeds the increase in the value of the shares owned initially by the founder. Things are more
complicated when trade is anonymous (DeMarzo and Urosevic 2001), or when the founder
shares some of the private benefits of control with the manager, as in the next section.  In these
instances, we need to make the assumption that there is no retrading, or alternatively that the
manager’s wage can be conditioned on the founder’s final equity stake.
III.    Transferable private benefits of control
In section II, the founder cannot by assumption extract any private benefits Φ  unless he
manages the firm himself. The founder’s interest and that of the minority shareholders are
perfectly congruent when a professional manager runs the firm. In this section we consider the
other extreme, where the private benefits are perfectly transferable, thereby aligning the
founder’s interest in expropriation with that of the professional manager.   For example, the
founder and the manager can jointly create a private company that does business with the public
firm, and divert cash flows to their private company through related transactions at non-market
prices, such as asset sales, transfer pricing, or loan guarantees.
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The possibility of sharing the spoils with the professional provides a new rationale for
monitoring, namely to secure for the founder a larger share of the private benefits.  Monitoring
becomes a rent-seeking activity.  Below we repeat the analytical steps of the previous section for
this case of transferable private benefits, and establish that the existence of the three patterns of
separation of ownership and management holds as before.  We then explore the implications of
the model for the relationship between legal protection, share value, block premium, and the
agency costs of separating ownership and management. Transferable private benefits only matter
in the presence of a professional manager, leaving the founder’s welfare in the case of no
separation unchanged (Lemma 1).  We therefore move directly to the case of separation of
ownership and management.
At date 3, the law imposes that Mv)1( φ− be paid out either as dividends to all
shareholders or as the wage to the professional manager. The founder and the professional
manager bargain over how to share the remaining Mvφ . For simplicity, we assume Nash
bargaining with equal bargaining power.  That is, both the founder and the manager receive their
outside options, plus half the surplus. The payoff that each party obtains if bargaining were to
break down, i.e., the outside option, depends on monitoring. If the founder monitors with
intensity m, his outside option is Mmvα , which corresponds to his share of security benefits
salvaged from managerial expropriation.  Due to the constraint m φ≤ , the outside option is equal
to { }MM vmv φαα ,min .  The outside option of the professional manager is the fraction of
revenues that he does not have to disgorge to shareholders.  For the same reason, ( m φ≤ ), this is
equal to { }Mvm)(,0max −φ .  The surplus to be shared in the bargaining between the founder and
the manager is the difference between Mvφ  and the sum of the two outside options, and is equal
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to { }MM vmv φαα )1(,)1(min −− . Under the assumption of equal bargaining power, the founder
receives in the bargaining a payment equal his outside option plus half the surplus, or



 ++
MM vmv 2
1,
2
1min αφα , and the manager likewise gets 


 

 +−− MM vmv 2
1,
2
1max αφαφ .
Since these payoffs exceed their outside options, the founder and the manager always agree to set
φ φ= .  They expropriate minority shareholders to the maximum, and share the spoils.14
At date 2, the founder chooses the monitoring intensity to maximize
.
2
]
2
1)1([
2mkvmw M −++−− αφα  Since the law already protects (1 ) Mvφ−  of the revenues from
extraction, there is no gain in monitoring more than φ . The founder therefore chooses



 += Mvkm 2
1,min αφ . If (1 ) / 2Mv kφ α> +  holds, monitoring does not depend on the block size
and is purely driven by the prospect of extracting a part of the private benefits. Otherwise
( (1 ) / 2Mv kφ α≤ + ), monitoring is a function of both private benefits and the ownership stake.
Indeed, decomposing the first order condition into ( / ) [(1 ) / 2]( / )M Mv k v kα α+ −  reveals
the two motives for monitoring. The first term reflects monitoring in the absence of collusion
aimed at preventing managerial expropriation of the founder’s stake α . The second term
captures the additional monitoring that the founder undertakes to appropriate some of the private
benefits. While monitoring increases as before with the block size α , the second term implies
that monitoring is positive even when the founder retains no shares, i.e., .0)0( >m  This implies
that the founder cannot withdraw from the firm. To remove this purely mechanical feature of the
model, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 3: If the founder retains less than 0>α , he abstains from monitoring.
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Assumption 3 simply means that, to monitor effectively, the founder must have some
power over the manager, and for that he needs a minimum ownership stake.  This stake may
enable him to sit on the board, to have enough shares to convene an extraordinary shareholder
meeting, to have standing in litigation, or to exercise power in other ways.  When the stake of the
founder is below the threshold α , he has no power vis-à-vis the manager. Put differently, owning
a stake below α  and dispersing the shares among small investors enables the founder to commit
not to interfere through monitoring in the running of the firm.15
When α α≥ , the founder monitors in part to avoid expropriation by the professional
manager, but he does so only to help himself.  Indeed, from the minority shareholders’
perspective, monitoring is a pure rent-seeking activity. The founder and the professional manager
agree to set φ φ=  irrespective of the monitoring intensity m.16  This result illustrates an
important difference between legal shareholder protection and monitoring: while the law protects
all the shareholders, monitoring in this model is a form of self-protection by the founder, which
has either positive or negative externalities for other investors.
At date 1, the professional manager accepts to run the firm if ( (1 ) / 2) Mw m v cφ α+ − + ≥ .
The condition that the wage and the manager’s share of the private benefits exceed the outside
utility can be rewritten as






+
−+≡≤
M
M
v
cvwmm
2
1
)(
,min α
φφ
The maximum level of monitoring compatible with the professional manager’s
participation constraint decreases with the founder’s stake. A larger block increases the founder’s
outside option in the bargaining, thereby reducing the share of private benefits that the
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professional manager obtains. Nonetheless, as (1 ) / 2 1,α+ ≤ the threshold m  is higher for a
given wage w and legal protection φ  when founder and professional manager collude than in the
absence of collusion. Withholding Mmv)1( α−  from the minority shareholders makes it more
likely that the professional manager’s participation constraint is satisfied.
At date 0, the founder chooses ownership α  and wage w  to maximize his welfare
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1)1(
2mkmvvwV MM
S −++−−= αφ .
The founder’s welfare is composed of three terms: the first, Mvw)1( −−φ , is the
dividends accruing to all shareholders if there were no monitoring (again, the founder obtains
this amount as the value of the block and as the proceeds from selling shares at date 0); the
second, [(1 ) / 2] Mmvα+ , is the share of private benefits that the founder extracts due to the
monitoring in the bargaining with the manager; and the third, 2 / 2km , is the monitoring cost.
Assumption 4: 2
2 1
M
kc
v
α ≤ −
Assumption 4 is purely technical, made to restrict the number of cases. The threshold
0α >  17  (Assumption 3) and Assumption 4 imply that the equilibrium monitoring intensity *m
is either zero or given by the first order condition *(1 ) / 2Mm v kα= + .18 In the absence of
Assumption 4, monitoring intensity for small φ  values would be determined by the legal
threshold ( φ=*m ), leaving the ownership structure indeterminate in that range of φ  values.
Nonetheless, all our results on founder welfare, share value, and separation of ownership and
management are robust with respect to relaxing Assumptions 3 and 4.
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Lemma 3  – illustrated in Figure 3 – replicates Lemma 2 with an added twist due to
collusion and a discontinuity in the feasible monitoring level.19 In particular, region i) coincides
with region i) in Lemma 2 and region v) with region iii) of Lemma 2. The differences between
transferable and non-transferable private benefits appear in the intermediate range of legal
protection.20  In region iv), weak legal protection permits private benefits to an extent that
sharing them between the founder and the professional manager is compatible with the
participation constraint and a zero wage.  Indeed, to avoid leaving a rent to the manager, the
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founder has to retain α α>  and monitor accordingly.  In contrast, in regions ii) and iii), where
the law is more protective, a zero wage, sharing of private benefits, and satisfying the
professional manager’s participation constraint are not compatible with each other. Because of
the discontinuity in monitoring, the founder faces a trade-off between under- and over-
monitoring. More precisely, the founder has the option to either not monitor or to monitor at least
(1 ) / 2Mm v kα= + . While abstaining from monitoring concedes a rent to the professional
manager, monitoring with intensity (1 ) / 2Mm v kα= +  requires a positive wage to satisfy the
participation constraint. In region ii), the sum of the wage and the monitoring cost when
(1 ) / 2Mm v kα= +  exceeds the rent that the professional manager can extract.  Hence, it is
optimal to fully disperse ownership and to leave the manager with a rent of cvR M −= φ . The
reverse holds in region iii): over-monitoring and compensating the professional manager with a
wage to satisfy the participation constraint is less costly to the founder. Consequently, the
optimal ownership concentration jumps to αα =* .
Another implication of Lemma 3 is that the founder cannot gain from selling the entire
company to a penniless professional manager who would raise funds in the capital market. From
the discussion of the no separation case, it follows that the professional manager could raise at
most Mv)1( φ− in the market.  Moreover, he will never pay more than cvM − . Simple inspection
shows that the founder’s welfare SV  is always at least as large as the minimum of Mv)1( φ− and
cvM − . Hence selling the entire company to a penniless manager is weakly dominated by selling
(some) stock in the market and hiring a professional manager.
The feature of Lemma 3 that is both crucial for the subsequent results and robust to
relaxing Assumptions 3 and 4 is that the agency cost of separation of ownership and
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management rises as investor protections become weaker. When φ  increases, the professional
manager can appropriate a larger fraction of the revenues.  This in turn implies either more
monitoring or a larger rent. Since the founder ultimately bears the agency cost, his welfare
weakly decreases with φ .
The final step in analyzing the founder’s decision to hire a professional manager (and to
float part of the equity) is the comparison of Lemma 1 with Lemma 3. Since Lemmas 2 and 3
coincide for / Mc vφ ≤  and / /M Mc v v kφ > + , Proposition 1 continues to hold. When the amenity
potential is very high )( FM vcvB −−> , it is never optimal for the founder to separate
ownership and management. As before, a necessary condition to have separation is
FM vcvB −−≤ .  Also, if the discrepancy between the competence of the professional manager
and that of the founder is very large ( 2 / 2M Fv k v B≥ + ), separation is always superior.
In the remaining case ( 2 / 2M F Mv k v B v c< + < − ), the decision to separate or not depends
on legal protection. When legal protection is good ( / Mc vφ ≤ ), ownership and management are
separated, and ownership is fully dispersed. When legal protection is less strong ( / Mc vφ > ), the
founder’s welfare SV  under separation and collusion (weakly) decreases with φ .  Hence,
Proposition 2 also continues to hold: there exists a unique threshold 
**
( / ,1]Mc vφ ∈  above which
the sum of agency cost and foregone amenity potential B  exceeds the loss in managerial
efficiency, and keeping management in the family is optimal. The threshold 
**φ  again denotes
the φ  value where * *( , , )S NSV w Vα φ =  holds. As we show below, it is smaller than the threshold
*φ  derived in the previous section. The only qualitative difference from the case with non-
transferable private benefits is that separation and concentrated ownership may or may not be an
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equilibrium outcome. That is, the threshold value 
**φ  at which the founder switches to no
separation may entail a concentrated or a dispersed ownership structure under separation, i.e.,
both 
***( )α φ α>  and ***( ) 0α φ =  are possible.
From the founder’s perspective, legal protection and monitoring are substitutes: both
restrict the professional manager’s ability to extract private benefits. While monitoring is costly,
better legal protection comes at no cost to the founder. This has two implications. First, as legal
protection improves, the level of monitoring falls, which in turn entails a less concentrated
ownership structure.  Proposition 3 thus also holds with transferable private benefits: legal
protection and ownership concentration are inversely related under separation of ownership and
management. Second, weaker legal protection raises the agency cost of separation. Hence, hiring
a professional manager in regimes with weaker legal rules requires higher managerial skills
(Corollary 1).
The quality of the law also affects share value, defined as the total amount of dividends
paid out to all shareholders at the final date.
Proposition 4
Share value increases as legal shareholder protection improves.
From the minority shareholders’ perspective, monitoring is not a substitute for legal
protection when private benefits are transferable.  Ex post, both the founder and the manager
prefer to extract private benefits.  As a rent-seeking activity, monitoring merely determines how
the two split these private benefits.  In contrast, the law prescribes that no less than Mv)1( φ−  is
used for dividends and wage payments. Hence, the expected share value is equal to
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MvwS )1( −−= φ . For / ,Mc vφ ≤  better legal protection unambiguously increases share value
because the reduction in private benefits exceeds the wage increase.21 Nonetheless, the minority
shareholders are indifferent with respect to the quality of the legal rules because they always get
what they pay for. Because the minority shareholders anticipate at date 0 that the founder and the
manager will divert the fraction φ  of revenues, the founder’s proceeds from selling (1 )α− shares
are equal to (1 )Sα− .
Proposition 4 also holds when the founder or his family keeps control over the firm.
Since the founder sets φ φ=  at date 3 (unless 1α = ), better laws boost share value because a
larger fraction of the proceeds has to be paid out as dividends.
La Porta et al. (2002) examine the valuation of companies (relative to their assets) in
different countries, with different levels of shareholder protection.  They find that companies in
countries with above the world median measures of shareholder protection have Tobin’s Qs
about 20% higher than do comparable companies in countries with below world median
shareholder protection.  The positive association between investor protection and the valuation of
corporate assets survives a variety of controls for industry, ownership structure, and growth
opportunities.  Claessens et al. (2002) find similar evidence of higher valuation of companies in
more protective legal regimes using data from East Asia.
The positive relationship between share value and legal protection also has implications
for the value of the controlling block.
Corollary 2
Total block premium SV S−  increases as legal shareholder protection falls.
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When * ( ,1)α α∈ , the founder responds to lower investor protection by monitoring more.
Hence, his welfare is reduced by these extra monitoring costs (and possibly by the rent paid to
the manager). In contrast, monitoring has no positive impact on share value, and the law is the
only safeguard of dividends.  As a result, changes in the quality of the law have a larger impact
on share value than on the founder’s welfare.  Corollary 2 also holds when management and
ownership are not separated. Since the founder does not monitor in this case, his welfare is
independent of the law, while share value decreases with the quality of the law.
A number of recent empirical studies examine the valuation of block premia in different
jurisdictions.  For example, Zingales (1994) presents evidence of very significant premium on
the high voting rights shares trading on the Milan stock exchange.  Nenova (2002) explicitly
compares the value of a corporate voting right across legal jurisdictions in a sample of 661 dual-
class firms from 18 countries.  She presents striking evidence that control is more highly valued
in countries with inferior protection of minority shareholders, consistent with Corollary 2.
Using a different methodology for computing block premia, Dyck and Zingales (2002) extend
and confirm Nenova’s findings.
In contrast to minority shareholders whose wealth is independent of the law, the
founder’s welfare SV  increases with the quality of the law when ownership and management are
separated. The possibility of colluding with the manager also affects the founder’s welfare.
Proposition 5
Collusion between the founder and the manager increases the agency costs of separating
ownership and management.
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In equilibrium, the agency cost of separating ownership from management is the sum of
the monitoring cost and the managerial rent. Compared to the case with non-transferable private
benefits, the equilibrium level of monitoring is higher when private benefits are transferable.
This is so for two reasons. First, the rent-seeking motive induces the founder to monitor more for
a given α  and φ .  Higher levels of monitoring allow the founder to appropriate a larger share of
the private benefits.  From an ex ante perspective, however, the founder bears the cost of such
wasteful monitoring himself. Second, the professional manager receives a larger payoff for a
given monitoring intensity m. Rather than increasing the dividends for all shareholders by Mmv ,
the founder and the professional manager withhold the minority shareholders’ share Mmv)1( α−
and split it among themselves. Consequently, collusion requires higher monitoring levels in order
to avoid leaving a rent to the professional manager. When private benefits are transferable, the
impossibility of fine-tuning monitoring (under-monitoring) also allows the manager to obtain a
positive rent in the range 2[ / , / (1 ) / 8 ]M M Mc v c v v kφ α∈ + + . The rent in very poor legal regimes
( / /M Mc v v kφ > + ) is identical with non-transferable and transferable private benefits, as the two
cases coincide once ownership is fully concentrated ( 1α = ).
The present model formalizes legal shareholder protection as a limit on the share of
corporate resources that the party in control can divert as private benefits.  The law can protect
shareholders in other ways as well.  One possibility suggested by Proposition 5 is that legal rules
can hinder or prevent collusion between the founder and the manager.  Examples of such legal
rules are equal treatment provisions and fiduciary duties. In fact, Proposition 5 provides a
rationale for such rules. They reduce the agency costs of separation of ownership from
management, thereby increasing the founder’s welfare.22
Collusion influences the founder’s welfare when ownership and management are
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separated as well as his decision whether to hire a professional manager.
Corollary 3
Collusion between the founder and the manager is detrimental to the hiring of a
professional manager, i.e. 
*** φφ ≤ .
When ownership and control are separated, the founder’s welfare is lower with
transferable than with non-transferable private benefits. In contrast, collusion has no impact on
his welfare when control is kept in the family. Hiring a professional manager is therefore
comparatively less attractive when private benefits are transferable.
IV. Conclusion: the separation of ownership from management
It is often claimed that there are two paradigms of corporate governance: the Anglo-
Saxon paradigm centered on the conflict between the shareholders and the manager, and the rest
of the world paradigm where the conflict is between large and small shareholders. We show that
the two paradigms are special cases of a single model of managerial succession, in which the
founder must simultaneously decide whether to hire an outside professional manager (as opposed
to keeping management in the family) and how much of the shares to float. We argue that this
decision is to some extent shaped by the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders, and
derive implications for optimal succession and ownership structures from this premise.
We show that in the regimes of the strongest legal protection of minority shareholders,
the optimal solution for the founder is to hire the best professional manager and sell off the entire
firm in the stock market – unless his amenity potential of keeping control in the family is huge.
This gives rise to the Anglo-Saxon model, in which the law is the principal constraint on
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managerial discretion and the agency conflict is between the manager and small minority
shareholders. With intermediate protection of minority shareholders, the founder still hires a
professional manager, but the law is not strong enough to control managerial discretion, and the
founder or his children must stay on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. This gives
rise to the twin problems of a conflict between the manager and the controlling shareholders, but
also between the two of them and minority outside investors. When the protection of minority
shareholders is the weakest, the agency problems are too severe to allow for separation of
ownership and management.  The founding family must stay on and run the firm; they can only
afford to cede control to a professional manager if they make him a member of the family.  The
separation of ownership and management is thus an indication of a superior corporate
governance environment. The lack of such separation, and the prevalence of family firms, is
evidence of financial underdevelopment.
Our analysis raises the question of why entrepreneurs do not lobby the government for
better investor protection.  In the model, if a country improves investor protection ex ante, before
the entrepreneur has sold off any shares in the market, he would be strictly better off.   On the
other hand, for a founder who has already sold a substantial fraction of his company, an
improvement in investor protection entails a reduction of the private benefits of control, while
the gains in the valuation of publicly traded shares accrue not to him but to the public
shareholders.    Many of these founders are therefore worse off from the improvement in the
corporate governance environment, and indeed the established families generally oppose such
reforms in developing countries (La Porta et al. 2000b).   The new entrepreneurs, as well as firms
with significant needs for outside financing, would benefit from legal reform, but their voices are
rarely as influential as those of publicly traded family firms in the political debate.
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Footnotes
1. A related literature describes how control is maintained by a dominant shareholder, which may
or may not be a family.  This literature focuses on pyramids, multiple classes of stock with
different voting rights, voting trusts, etc. (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1988), Prowse (1995),
Zingales (1994), Nenova (2002)).
2. For a sample of S&P 500 firms, Anderson and Reeb (2002) present evidence that Tobin’s Q’s
are actually higher for family than for non-family businesses.  They also find that performance
measures deteriorate at high levels of family ownership, consistent with the view that entrenched
family control is associated with inferior performance even in the U.S.
3. The amount ivφ is the legal upper bound that can be extracted as private benefits of control,
irrespective of the form in which those benefits are enjoyed. In particular, wages in excess of
market value are already incorporated in ivφ .
4. We assume that there is no reason for the founder to sell his shares to another large
shareholder who would monitor, since, if anything, the founder has a comparative advantage at
monitoring because of his knowledge.  In addition, the founder may want to retain his stake
because of some residual amenity potential.
5. Modeling the differences in legal shareholder protection by varying the efficiency of the
monitoring technology or by changing the upper bound on diversion is equivalent when the
founder and the small shareholders have congruent interests. With collusion between the founder
and the professional manager (section III), this equivalence breaks down because monitoring
protects the founder but not the shareholders from managerial expropriation.
6. The subsequent analysis implicitly assumes that 1wφ + < , which holds in equilibrium.
7. The range [0,1]m∈  implies that Mk v≥ .
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8. An alternative interpretation of the model is one where the manager has to exert an effort to
generate revenues Mv and c is the disutility of the effort.
9. The conclusions of Lemma 2 also obtain if we use the efficiency of monitoring (cost
parameter k ) rather than the upper bound on diversion as the measure of legal shareholder
protection, with one difference. Since the founder and the small shareholders have congruent
interests, legal protection and monitoring are substitutes when φ  is the measure of legal
protection, but complements when k is the measure of legal protection.
10. The private and social calculations are further complicated when there are private costs of
compliance with legal rules.  For example, the costs of complying with better accounting and
disclosure standards might be higher.
11. The (inverse) relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection depends
crucially on the absence of wealth constraints of the founder and the assumed monitoring
technology. In particular, the positive relationship between optimal monitoring intensity and
ownership concentration relies on the assumption that the incentive to monitor depends on the
ownership stake but is independent of legal protection. By contrast, when legal protection has a
direct impact on the (marginal) return from monitoring the relationship between the quality of
the law and ownership concentration is not monotone (Burkart and Panunzi 2001).
12. In Taiwan, the top 15 families control 20.1% of listed corporate assets; in Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the top 15 families control
more than 25% of listed corporate assets.
13. A proof of a similar result is contained in Burkart, Gromb, Panunzi (1997) and Pagano and
Roell (1998).
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14.  The question arises again whether there are any gains from using monetary incentives to
induce the manager to abstain from extracting private benefits.  At first glance this seems
possible, since the manager receives only half of the surplus.  While the use of such a
compensation scheme is in the minority shareholders’ interest, the founder prefers ex post to
extract private benefits.  Since such extraction is efficient, the founder is ex ante indifferent.  All
that matters is to keep the manager’s participation constraint binding, i.e., to leave him no rents.
15. In the absence of collusion, fully dispersed ownership (α =0) ensures no monitoring
(m(0)=0).  Introducing a threshold α  in Section II would have complicated the analysis without
adding any insight.
16. If one introduces a dead-weight loss associated with private benefit extraction, monitoring
also benefits minority shareholders because the founder internalizes part of the inefficiency and
hence reduces the level of diversion (Burkart and Panunzi 2001).
17. As 0>α , Assumption 4 implies that / 2 /M Mv k c v≤ .
18. Rearranging Assumption 4 to (1 ) / 2 /M Mv k c vα+ ≤  shows that for all / Mc vφ >  the first
order condition and not the constraint m φ≤  determines the monitoring intensity. Since
monitoring is zero in equilibrium for / Mc vφ ≤ , the constraint m φ≤  never binds in equilibrium.
19. There is another difference between Lemma 2 and 3. When legal protection is measured by
the upper bound on diversion, the founder’s welfare under separation SV  decreases with φ  both
in the case of transferable and in the case of non-transferable private benefits. When legal
protection is measured by monitoring efficiency, SV does not always decrease with k in the case
of transferable private benefits (region iii) of Lemma 3).  Since monitoring in this setting is also
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a rent-seeking activity, lower k values lead to more monitoring in equilibrium – a cost ultimately
paid by the founder.
20. Irrespective of Assumptions 3 and 4, the equilibrium outcome with collusion is more
complicated than Lemma 2. In the absence of Assumptions 3 and 4, the complication is due to
the fact that monitoring may be determined by the law ( φ=*m ) rather than by the first order
condition.
21. In contrast, variations in k have no impact on share value because a more efficient monitoring
technology does not benefit the minority shareholders when under collusion. This independence
suggests that modeling legal (minority) shareholder protection in terms of efficient monitoring
technology may not be appropriate.
22. In contrast, minority shareholder wealth is affected neither by the quality of the law nor by
collusion, except for  unanticipated changes thereof. Then purchasing shares at date 0, they pay
no more than the date 3 share value.
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Figure 3:  Illustration of Lemma 3.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
For M
M
c v
v k
φ > +  the professional manager’s participation constraint
( / )M Mw v k v cφ α+ − ≥  is slack for any admissible pair ( , )wα . Since / 0SdV dα >  and
/ 0SdV dw < , 1* =α  and 0* =w  is the solution. Thus, for M
M
c v
v k
φ > +  ( 1) /Mm v kα = = ,
2
* *( , , ) (1 )
2
S M
M
vV w v
k
α φ φ= − + , and the professional manager receives a rent
cv
k
vR MM −−= )(φ  (part iii).
For 
k
v
v
c M
M
+≤φ  the professional manager’s participation constraint binds. Rearranging
this binding constraint to ( )
M M
c kw
v v
α φ= + − and substituting α  in the objective function
yields 
2
2
S
M
M
k cV v c w
v
φ = − − + −   , which decreases with w . Consequently, the founder sets
w  at the lowest value compatible with 0w ≥  and 0α ≥ . Hence, 



 −= φ
Mv
cw ,0max , and there
are two cases: For 
Mv
c≤φ , * 0α = , *
M
cw
v
φ= − , * 0m = , and * *( , , )S MV w v cα φ = −  (part i).
For M
M M
c v c
v k v
φ+ ≥ > , * 2( )M M
ck
v v
φα  = −  
, * 0w = , *
M
cm
v
φ= − , and
2
* *( , , )
2
S
M
M
k cV w v c
v
α φ φ = − − −   (part ii).
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Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1 BvV F
NS += , and by Lemma 2 S MV v c= −  for / Mc vφ ≤ . Thus, if
FM vcvB −−> , NS SV V>  for [0,1]φ ∈ . Since SV  decreases with φ , SV  reaches its minimum
2 / 2 .Mv k  at 1=φ . Therefore, if kvBv MF 2/2<+ , then S NSV V>  for [0,1]φ ∈ .
Proof of Proposition 2
For / ,Mc vφ ≤ cvV MS −= and BvV FNS += .  If FM vcvB −−< , then separation is always
optimal.  For M
M M
c v c
v k v
φ+ ≥ >  
2
* *( , , )
2
S
M
M
k cV w v c
v
α φ φ = − − −   and
( )/ / 0S MdV d k c vφ φ= − − < , while for M
M
c v
v k
φ > +  
2
* *( , , ) (1 )
2
S M
M
vV w v
k
α φ φ= − +  and
/ 0S MdV d vφ = − < . Moreover, the two expressions for SV  coincide when M
M
c v
v k
φ = + . Hence,
SV decreases with φ  and is continuous in φ  for 
Mv
c>φ . Since NSV  is independent of φ
(Lemma 1), there exists a unique 
*
( / ,1)Mc vφ ∈  where NS SV V=  provided that ( 1)NS SV V φ> =
i.e., 2 / 2 .F Mv B v k+ >
Proof of Corollary 1
As NSV  is independent of φ , it suffices to show that for 
Mv
c>φ  / 0S MdV dv >  and
/ 0SdV dφ < . The latter is shown in the proof of Proposition 2. For M
M
c v
v k
φ > +
/ (1 ) / 0S M MdV dv v kφ= − + > . For  M
M M
c v c
v k v
φ+ ≥ >
51
2 2/ 1 ( ) 1 1 0( )
S M
M
M M M M M M
c c c v c c cdV dv k k
v v v k v v v
φ  = − − ≥ − + − = − >    as k
v
v
c M
M
+≤φ .
Proof of Lemma 3
For M
M
c v
v k
φ > +  the monitoring intensity is given by 1
2
M
M
vm v
k k
α φ+= ≤ < , and the
professional manager’s participation constraint 1( )
2 M
w m v cαφ ++ − ≥ is slack for any
admissible pair ( , wα ) .  Hence, as in Lemma 2,  1* =α , 0* =w , * /Mm v k= , and
2
* *( , , ) (1 )
2
S M
M
vV w v
k
α φ φ= − +  (part v).
Consider now the range M
M
c v
v k
φ ≤ + . Suppose for the time being that the monitoring
intensity is given by the FOC 1
2 M
m v
k
α+= . That is, abstract from the discontinuity in monitoring
and from the possibility that 1
2 M
v
k
α φ+ >  . Then the participation constraint must be binding.
Rearranging the constraint to (1 )
2M
c mw
v
αφ += − +  and substituting w  in the founder’s
objective function yields 
2
2mkcvV M
S −−=  which decreases with m. Thus, the founder
chooses the lowest monitoring intensity compatible with 0≥m  and 0w ≥ . For 
Mv
c≤φ , 0m = ,
that is, α α< , and 
M
cw
v
φ= − . Otherwise, 0w =  is optimal. The corresponding optimal
ownership concentration 2 ( ) 1M
M
k v c
v
α φ= − −  and monitoring intensity Mv cm
k
φ −=  obtain
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from using the FOC 1
2 M
m v
k
α+=  in the professional manager’s participation constraint.
These are the solutions to the founder’s maximization problem only if they satisfy the
conditions that the monitoring intensity is both given by the FOC, i.e., φ≤*m , and feasible, i.e.,
* 10,
2 M
m v
k
α+ ∉   . Zero monitoring trivially satisfies both conditions and αα <
*  and
*
M
cw
v
φ= −   is indeed the solution for 
Mv
c≤φ . The founder’s welfare is * *( , , )S MV w v cα φ = −
(part i).
For M
M M
c c v
v v k
φ< ≤ + , the first condition ( φ≤*m ) is equivalent to Mv c
k
φ φ− ≤  which
is always satisfied because, by Assumption 4, 
M
M
v
c
k
v ≤
2
. Given Mv cm
k
φ −= , the second
condition ( * 1
2 M
m v
k
α+≥ ) is equivalent to .
4
)1( 2
M
M
v
kv
c αφ ++≥  Therefore, 0* =w ,
1)(2* −−= cvk
v MM
φα , and 
k
cvm M −= φ*  is the solution only for
2(1 )
4
M
M
M M
c c vv
v k v k
α φ++ < ≤ + . The founder’s resulting welfare is
2
),,( ** cvcvwV MM
S −−−= φφα  (part iv).
For 
2(1 )
4 MM M
c c v
v v k
αφ +< ≤ + , the only two possible optimal levels of monitoring are
0=m  and Mvkm 2
1 α+= . (Note that 221
M
kc
v
α+ ≤  (Assumption 4) implies that
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2
1 2
2 2M MM M
kc cv v
k kv v
α φ+ ≤ = < .) If 0=m  (that is, αα < ), 0w =  and MS vV )1( φ−= . If
Mvk
m
2
1 α+=  (i.e., αα = ), the participation constraint implies 
2(1 )
4 MM
cw v
v k
αφ += − + , and
2
2(1 )
8
S
M MV v c vk
α+= − − .  Simple calculations show that 
2
2(1 ) (1 )
8M M M
v c v v
k
α φ+− − > −  holds
for 
2(1 )
8 MM
c v
v k
αφ +> + . Thus, for 
2(1 )
8 MM M
c c v
v v k
αφ +< ≤ + , *α α< , * 0w = , * 0m = , and
* *( , , ) (1 )S MV w vα φ φ= −  (part ii), while for 
2 2(1 ) (1 )
8 4M MM M
c cv v
v k v k
α αφ+ ++ < ≤ + ,  *α α= ,
M
M
v
kv
cw
4
)1( 2* αφ ++−= , * 1
2 M
m v
k
α+= , and 
2
* * 2(1 )( , , )
8
S
M MV w v c vk
αα φ += − −  (part iii).
Proof of Proposition 4
Over the five regions of Lemma 3 share value MvwS )1(
*−−= φ  (weakly) decreases
with φ  as the subsequent derivations of the explicit expression of S  in each region show.
For 
M
c
v
φ ≤  *(1 ) M MS w v v cφ= − − = −  holds.
For 
2(1 )
8 MM M
c c v
v v k
αφ +< ≤ +  MvS )1( φ−=  which decreases with φ  and is equal
MS v c= −  at the lower bound of the interval, i.e., for 
M
c
v
φ = , and equal to
2
2(1 )
8M M
S v c v
k
α+= − −  at the upper bound, i.e., for M
M
v
kv
c
8
)1( 2αφ ++= .
For  
2 2(1 ) (1 )
8 4M MM M
c cv v
v k v k
α αφ+ ++ < ≤ +   
2
2(1 )
4M M
S v c v
k
α+= − −  holds.
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For 
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4
M
M
M M
c c vv
v k v k
α φ++ < ≤ +  MvS )1( φ−=  which decreases with φ  and is equal
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For M
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v k
φ > + , MvS )1( φ−=  which decreases with φ  and is equal to 
2
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M
vS v c
k
= − −
at the lower bound of the interval, i.e., for M
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Proof of Corollary 2
The block premium is meaningful only in the range where *1 0α> > , i.e. in regions iii)
and iv) of Lemma 3. For 
2 2(1 ) (1 )
8 4M MM M
c cv v
v k v k
α αφ+ ++ < ≤ +   *α α=  and
2
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Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by NCSV  the founder’s welfare in the absence of collusion (Lemma 2) and by
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CSV  his welfare with collusion (Lemma 3). For M
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c c v
v v k
φ< ≤ +  NC CS SV V≥  as the subsequent
comparisons show, while NCSV  and  CSV  coincide for 
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c≤φ  and for 
k
v
v
c M
M
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regions i) and v) of Lemma 3.
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Rearranging this inequality  we obtain 
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αφ  +− ≤   . Since the LHS increases with φ  it is sufficient to check the inequality
is satisfied at the upper bound of the interval. Substituting  
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